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Models to mimic the transmission of information in financial markets are introduced. As an
attempt to generate the demand process, we distinguish between dictatorship associations, where
groups of agents rely on one of them to make decision, and democratic associations, where each
agent takes part in the group decision. In the dictatorship model, agents segregate into two distinct
populations, while the democratic model is driven towards a critical state where groups of agents of
all sizes exist. Hence, both models display a level of organization, but only the democratic model
is self-organized. We show that the dictatorship model generates less volatile markets than the
democratic model.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Understanding the microscopic dynamics of financial
markets is a challenging problem that has recently at-
tracted the attention of physicists [1–4]. There have
been a lot of studies of the time series of returns on var-
ious time scales [5,6]. For intraday variations, Le´vy sta-
ble distributions with parameter between 1.35 and 1.8
have been proposed for the distribution of the returns
[6], while on longer time scales, the distribution seems
to converge towards a normal distribution. Moreover,
the large fluctuations on short time scales are observed
to decrease according to a power law with an exponent
approximately equal to 3 [6].
The short time scale distribution for the returns is in
obvious contradiction of one the first models for finan-
cial markets, in which it is assumed that the stochastic
process for the returns is an uncorrelated random walk
[7]. In such a framework, the distribution for the returns
should converge towards a Gaussian distribution, accord-
ing to the central limit theorem. Several scenarios have
been proposed to account for the deviations from Gaus-
sian distributions, in terms of weakly interacting agents
[5], multi-agent markets [8], through heteroskedasticity
[9] or through herding [10]. Each of these explanations
has its own motivations and associated drawbacks. These
are discussed and documented in [10]. In this paper, we
concentrate on the hypothesis of herding, whose main
advantage is that it is so simple that some analytical cal-
culations can be carried out.
Herding assumes that agents are not making deci-
sions independently, but that each agent is a member of
a group that makes a collective decision. The larger this
group is, the bigger the impact it has on the market when
the group trades together. In the herding assumption,
these groups are responsible for the large fluctuations
observed in the changes of the prices. The existence of
herding is well documented [11–13], while its origin can
be interpreted in a number of ways, such as by agents
sharing the same information, using the same analytical
tools or following the same rumours.
In this paper, we propose two extensions of previous
models for herding [10,14]. In these early models, no
attempt was made to consider the generation of the de-
mand process. Consequently, the number of transactions
had to be tuned to a low level to ensure the appearance
of fat tails in the change of price distribution. In this
paper, the process of demand is modelled with two types
of association, that we choose to call dictatorship and
democratic. Both models are explained in detail in the
next section, while they are investigated numerically and
analytically in the later sections.
II. THE MODELS
The proposed models are extensions of the model of
Egu´ıluz and Zimmermann [14,15], which is itself a dy-
namical formulation of a model by Cont and Bouchaud
[10]. Initially, every agent is given a random number p
between 0 and 1, chosen from a uniform distribution. A
cluster of agents is a set of agents that share the same
value of p. Agents belonging to a cluster make the same
decisions between buying, selling or doing nothing. At
the beginning of the simulation, all the agents are inde-
pendent, with just one agent per cluster. At each time
step, two agents i and j, with associated numbers pi and
pj respectively, are selected at random. With a proba-
bility aij = |pi − pj |, agent i and all the agent belonging
to his cluster are given a new random number chosen
from the range [pi−R, pi+R]. We say that all the links
between these agents are removed or that the cluster of
agent i is fragmented. With a probability 1 − aij , all
the agents belonging to the clusters of agents i and j
are given the same number pij . In other words, the two
clusters coagulate. For the dictatorship model, pij = pi,
while for the democratic model, pij = (pi + pj)/2.
We assume that p is a simple parameter used to code
the character of an agent. According to our definition
of aij , agents with similar characters are more inclined
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to associate, that is for pi ≃ pj, aij is close to 0. Of
course, this terminology should not be taken literally.
Apart from the highly unrealistic idea of coding some-
body’s character in just one real number, the dynamics
of the models imply that agents are changing their char-
acters by making associations. Consequently, even if we
call p the character of an agent, it would be better to keep
in mind that p reflects the way an agent is perceived in
the market, rather than the personality of the agent him-
self. In the dictatorship model, all the agents belonging
to a cluster are sharing the character of one of them. In
other words, the whole cluster makes decisions according
to the character of one agent. On the contrary, in the
democratic model, the character of a cluster of agents is
a linear combination of the characters of all the agents
belonging to the cluster. This means that the character
of each agent belonging to a cluster has an influence on
the decision process. The chosen average in the demo-
cratic model is not strictly speaking democratic, because
not all the agents have the same weight on the character
of the cluster. However, various weighted averages have
been considered, using the size of the clusters coagulating
for instance, but no qualitative difference in the results
was observed. As a consequence, we will stick to the
previously defined average for its analytical simplicity.
As in the original paper by Egu´ıluz and Zimmermann
[14], we associate the fragmentation of a cluster with the
decision from the group of agents that it is time to buy
or to sell, both decisions being equally likely to occur.
After a transaction is performed, the links between the
agents are removed. This process tends to mimic the
dynamics of the connections in financial markets, where
associations are usually for a fixed time, or for a given
purpose. When the deadline or the purpose is attained,
agents are free to renew their association or to try new
contacts. Alternatively, if the association of agents is
interpreted as agents sharing the same information, this
information becomes useless after a transaction, and the
association no longer exists. In our model, we simply give
new values for the character p of each agent in a given
range R around the old value p0. This choice allows us
to introduce a kind of memory into the system. Agents
that were already connected are more likely to connect
again, because their p values are closer than two agents
chosen at random.
To compare the two types of coagulation process, a
price is defined. The price is generated by the differ-
ence between the supply and demand. Every time that a
transaction is decided, the difference between the num-
ber of buying and selling orders is modified. We define
the return R at a given time t as the number of agents
buying at that time. If there is no transaction, R(t) = 0,
a cluster of s agents buying gives R(t) = s and for a
cluster of s agents selling, R(t) = −s. The change in the
logarithm of the price is assumed to be proportional to
R [10], that is
lnP (t)− lnP (t− 1) =
1
λ
R(t). (1)
The logarithm is introduced to ensure that the price is al-
10-6
10-5
0.0001
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
1 10 100 1000
n_s / N_0 - dem
power law
analytic
n
s N 0
s
FIG. 1. Cluster size distribution n(s)/N0 for the demo-
cratic model for N0 = 10
5 (continuous line with •) agents
after t = 107 time steps. The range is fixed to R = 0.1. The
dashed line is a guide to the eyes for a power law of exponent
−5/2, while the continuous line is the analytical expression
for ns/N0 for a = 0.1.
ways a positive quantity. The proportionality coefficient
λ determines the sensitivity of the price to variations in
the demand. The probability to have a return R of size s
is equal to the probability of having a cluster of s agents
making a transaction. If ns is defined as the number
of clusters of size s for a system with N0 agents, the
probability of having R = s for a transaction is equal to
sns/N0.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS FOR THE
DEMOCRATIC MODEL
If ns is the number of clusters of size s, sns/N0 is the
probability to select an agent belonging to a cluster of size
s when selecting an agent at random. The distribution
ns/N0 is presented in Fig. 1 for markets with N0 = 10
5
agents, when the range R is fixed to 0.1. The cluster size
distribution can be approximated by a power law, as
ns ∼ s
−αf
(
s
sc
)
(2)
where sc is the critical size where finite size effects be-
come dominant. In the previous equation, f(x) = 1 for
x < 1 and is going to 0 otherwise. To obtain an esti-
mate for sc, we assume that ns/N0 = (α − 2)s
−α. For a
particular choice of value of N0, the size effects should
be very important for s = sc where nsc ≃ 1, giving
sc ≃ (N0(α − 2))
1/α, in agreement with the numerical
simulations. For the largest size investigated, that is, for
N0 = 10
5, we obtain α = 2.6 ± 0.1. Our analytical re-
sults suggest that α = 5/2 for N0 → ∞, but with an
exponential correction to the power law, as shown by the
continuous line in Fig. 1. A dashed line corresponding
to a power law of exponent 5/2 is drawn for comparison.
The range R has no noticeable effect on ns. Numerically,
we observe that the smaller size systems always reach
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FIG. 2. Probability distribution Q(p) of the characters p of
the agents for the democratic model for N0 = 10
4 agents after
t = 107 time steps. The range is R = 0.1 (•) and R = 0.01
(×).
a frozen state, with a unique cluster including all the
agents. This is expected if the frequency of fragmenta-
tion is very low, as will be seen from the results for the
distribution of the characters p of the agents.
In Fig. 2, the distribution of the characters p is shown
for N0 = 10
5 agents, R = 0.1 and R = 0.01, for a dis-
cretization of 50 points. Q(p)dp is defined as the proba-
bility that an agent chosen at random has a character p
included in the range [p, p+dp]. As a first approximation,
the distribution can be written
Q(p) = δ(p− p0) (3)
with the Dirac delta distribution δ(x). p0 is a value of
p that is shared by most of the agents. As most of the
agents have a value of p close to p0, the fragmentation
rate is very low. The spreading around the value of p0 is
of the order of the range R, giving Eq. (3) as an exact
solution in the limit R→ 0.
Starting from a uniform distribution, the stationary
value for p0 is around 0.5. However, the convergence
to a unique value p0 for most of the agents comes from
the averaging process for the coagulation of clusters. As
a result, p0 is strongly dependent of our choice for the
initial distribution. For instance, using the distribution
S(p) =
{
1
h for p < h
0 otherwise
(4)
gives p0 ≃ h/2. The fragmentation process also generates
a very slow drift in the value for p0. Hence, the property
of the democratic model is that most agents are asso-
ciated with a value p near a common value p0, but the
value of p0 itself is meaningless. This property could have
been anticipated since aij only depends on the difference
between pi and pj, not on the absolute value of pi or pj.
We define an agent to be active at time t if she is the
one making her cluster buy or sell at time t. The dis-
tribution of the time between two successive activations
of an agent has been investigated, but it was found to
coincide with a random activation of one agent among
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FIG. 3. Cluster size distribution n(s)/N0 for the dictator-
ship model for N0 = 10
5 agents (continuous line with •) after
t = 107 time steps. The range is fixed to R = 0.1. The dashed
lines is a guide to the eyes for a power law of exponent −5/2,
while the continuous line represents Eq. (10) for a = 0.4.
N0. Simulations of the model were also performed on
one- and two-dimensional square lattices, with one agent
corresponding to one site. Connections are restricted to
first neighbouring sites. The distribution of the distance
between two successive active agents was found to coin-
cide with a random choice of an active site at each time
step. We conclude that the model does not display any
temporal or spatial correlations, apart from the cluster-
ing of agents.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS FOR THE
DICTATORSHIP MODEL
The same numerical simulations have been carried out
for the dictatorship model. Fig. 3 presents the size dis-
tribution ns/N0 for the dictatorship model for N0 = 10
5
agents and a value R = 0.1 for the range. The dicta-
torship model roughly displays a power law dependence
for the cluster size distribution, with finite size effects
becoming important for sc ≃ (N0(α − 2))
1/α, as given
in the previous section. sc is slightly overestimated com-
pared with numerical simulations. The exponent α, as
defined in Eq. (2), is estimated to be α = 3.0 ± 0.2 for
N0 = 10
5 agents. A value of α = 5/2 is expected from our
analytical results, but with an exponential correction as
represented by the continuous line in Fig. 3. The dashed
line shows a power law of exponent 5/2 for comparison.
R does not have any noticeable effect on ns/N0.
The distribution of the characters of the agents, Q(p),
is very different in this model compared to the previous
one. As can be seen in Fig. 4 obtained for 50 points with
the choices N0 = 10
4 agents, R = 0.1 and R = 0.01, most
agents are associated with values of p close to 0 or 1. As a
result, the total population of agents can be decomposed
into two subpopulations, one associated with p ≃ 0 and
one associated with p ≃ 1. Taking smaller values for
R enforces the separation in two populations, suggesting
that
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FIG. 4. Probability distribution Q(p) of the characters p
of the agents for the dictatorship model for N0 = 10
5 agents
after t = 107 time steps. The range is R = 0.1 (•) and
R = 0.01 (×).
Q(p) =
δ(p) + δ(1− p)
2
(5)
when R → 0. Agents belonging to the same popula-
tion have a high probability to be connected when they
interact. Conversely, agents belonging to different pop-
ulations would prefer to make a transaction rather than
communicate with each other. This gives an average frag-
mentation rate a close to 0.5, because the two populations
are of similar sizes. As this binary distribution is not put
in by hand, one is tempted to say that the model is self-
organized, meaning that a complex pattern has appeared
as a result of the dynamics of the model. However, as
will be shown later, the model is not self-organized in
the usual sense of a system being driven into a critical
state.
The distribution of the time between two successive
activations of an agent has also been investigated, giving
a random choice of one agent among N0 at each time
step. On-lattice simulations of the model show that the
distribution of the distance between two successive active
agents coincides with a random choice of an active site at
each time step. The dictatorship model, like the demo-
cratic model, does not display any temporal or spatial
correlations, apart from the clustering of agents.
V. ANALYTICAL RESULTS
Both models exhibit stationary cluster size distribu-
tions that are similar to those obtained in the original
models [10,14,15]. In this section, we assume that the
cluster size distribution ns/N0 and the character distri-
bution Q(p) are independent. The average fragmentation
rate of a cluster of character p is defined by
a(p) =
∫
1
0
dp1Q(p1)|p1 − p|. (6)
We assume that ns is a function of the average fragmen-
tation rate a only, defined by
a =
∫ 1
0
dpQ(p)a(p). (7)
We have checked that the stationary cluster size distri-
butions corresponding to different range of values for p
are equivalent to one another. The number ns of clusters
of size s > 1 evolves like
∂ns
∂t
= −asns +
(1 − a)
N0
s−1∑
r=1
rnr(s− r)ns−r
−
2(1− a)sns
N0
∞∑
r=1
rnr (8)
where N0 is the total number of agents. Note that
one time step in this formulation corresponds to one at-
tempted update per agent in the numerical simulation.
The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (8) describes
the fragmentation of a cluster of size s in the case of
a transaction involving s agents. The second term de-
scribes the creation of a new cluster of size s by coagula-
tion of two clusters of size r and s− r, with r < s. The
last term on the right-hand side describes the disappear-
ance of a cluster of size s by coagulation with another
cluster. The number of clusters of size 1, n1 obeys
∂n1
∂t
= a
∞∑
r=2
r2nr −
2(1− a)n1
N0
∞∑
r=1
rnr . (9)
The first term on the right-hand side describes the ap-
pearance of s clusters of size 1 by fragmentation of a
cluster of size s while the second term describes the disap-
pearance of clusters of size 1 by coagulation with another
cluster. As shown in [15], the cluster size distribution is
given by
ns ∼ N0
(
4(1− a)
(2− a)2
)s
s−5/2. (10)
Hence, the size distribution of the clusters follows a power
law corresponding to α = 5/2, with an exponential cut-
off, as in the original models [10,15]. For a = 0, the
exponential cut-off vanishes.
For the democratic model, a is close to 0 in the sta-
tionary state, all the agents being represented by a value
of p close to a common value p0. We present Eq. (10) for
a = 0.1 in Fig. 1. This situation is reminiscent of intra-
day transactions on financial markets, where a value of
a→ 0 is expected. On the contrary, for the dictatorship
model, a is close to 0.5 in the stationary state, because
the agents segregate into two populations of comparable
sizes. The probability of choosing two agents belonging
to the same population is almost equal to the probabil-
ity of choosing one agent in each population. For the
former, a coagulation process will almost certainly take
place, while for the latter a fragmentation process is very
likely to happen. Hence, coagulation and fragmentation
are equally likely to occur. Our analytical result for the
cluster size distribution is in reasonable agreement with
the results from the numerical simulations, as can be ap-
preciated in Fig. 1 and 3 for the democratic and the
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dictatorship models, respectively. The numerical esti-
mates of α for both models are larger than the analytical
ones, which is to be expected as the exponential correc-
tion term is a decreasing function of s for a ∈ (0, 1). Also,
because R 6= 0, a is lower than 1/2 in the dictatorship
model. In Fig. 3, we present Eq. (10) for a = 0.4.
Note that the two values of a obtained, a = 0 and
a = 0.5, are the minimum and the maximum values of
a that can be achieved in our models. For a character
p equal to a real number between 0 and 1, a can not be
greater than 0.5. Relaxing this constraint should allow us
to explore a richer set of models, while our two variations
seems to be representative of this class of models. In fact,
several variations for the coagulation process have been
investigated and all of them qualitatively reproduced the
results of either the democratic or the dictatorship model.
We assumed in Sec. II that the variation of the price
is a function of the variation of the balance between the
number of buyers and sellers through Eq. (1). For any
transaction, the probability to have a returnR of size s is
sns/N0. As the fragmentation rate is lower for the demo-
cratic model compared to the dictatorship model, bigger
clusters are more likely to form, giving bigger changes in
the price. As a result, prices in the democratic model
have a higher volatility.
Translating our models into SOC language [16], a
transaction can be associated with an avalanche. As all
the agents taking part in the same transaction share the
same character p, they are obviously correlated with each
other, showing that all the elements taking part in an
avalanche are correlated. As we showed numerically, no
other spatial or temporal correlations were detected in
either model. To have a system in a critical state, the
average size of a transaction should diverge. As shown
in [15], the average size of a transaction is given by 1/a.
Hence, the democratic model is self-organized but the
dictatorship model is not. The two processes character-
istic of a self-organized system are present, accumulation
in the form of a coagulation process and relaxation by
fragmentation. For a → 0, there is separation between
the time scales of these two processes, the coagulation
process appearing typically at each time step of the sim-
ulation, while the fragmentation process appears on aver-
age every 1/a time steps. This separation of time scales
is not present for any other values of a, except for a→ 1,
where no correlation between the agents can be built up
because the fragmentation rate is too high.
For the dictatorship model, the time master equation
for Q(p) is
∂Q(p)
∂t
= Q(p)
∫ 1
0
dp1Q(p1)(1− |p− p1|)× (11)
×
(
1
a(p1)
−
1
a(p)
)
+
R2
8
∂2Q(p)
∂p2
.
One time step corresponds to one attempted update per
agent. The first term consists of two contributions. The
coagulation of a cluster in p and a cluster in p1 to create
a cluster in p and the coagulation of a cluster in p and
a cluster in p1 to create a cluster in p1. Note that the
average size of a cluster of character p is equal to 1/a(p)
[15]. The last term corresponds to the diffusion of agents
by cluster fragmentation.
As can be seen from numerical simulations, the segre-
gation in two populations originates from the coagulation
process and is enhanced when R→ 0. Hence, we neglect
the diffusive term proportional to R2 as a first approxi-
mation, giving the stationary state as
Q(p)
∫
1
0
dp1Q(p1)(1 − |p− p1|)
(
1
a(p1)
−
1
a(p)
)
= 0.
(12)
A possible solution to this equation is a(p) = a, indepen-
dent of p. Taking the derivative of Eq. (6) with respect
to p, you have
−
∫
1
p
dp1Q(p1) +
∫ p
0
dp1Q(p1) = 0 (13)
The previous relation has Q(p) = (δ(p) + δ(1 − p))/2 as
solution. Eq. (5) is the stationary distribution forR→ 0.
For the democratic model, the time master equation
for the distribution Q(p) is
∂Q(p)
∂t
= −
Q(p)
a(p)
∫ 1
0
dp1Q(p1)(1− |p− p1|) +
R2
8a
∂2Q(p)
∂p2
+
∫
1
0
∫
1
0
dp1dp2Q(p1)Q(p2)
a(p1) + a(p2)
a(p1)a(p2)
× (14)
×(1− |p1 − p2|)δ
(
p1 + p2 − 2p
2
)
.
The first term on the right-hand side describes the aver-
age decrease of Q(p) when clusters in p are coagulating
with clusters of character p1. The last term is the in-
verse process, when Q(p) increases by coagulation of two
clusters. The second term corresponds to the diffusion of
agents due to the fragmentation of clusters.
As shown by the numerical results, the diffusive pro-
cess when a cluster is fragmented accounts for a very
small drift of the previously introduced value of p0. But
it is not sufficient to make this value independent of ini-
tial conditions. Hence, we neglect the term proportional
to R2 as a first approximation. The stationary state is
obtained for∫ 1
0
dp1Q(p1)(2Q(2p− p1)(1 − 2|p− p1|)
−Q(p)(1− |p− p1|)) = 0, (15)
This equation has Q(p) = δ(p − p0) as solution, where
p0 is free to take any value. The final value for p0 is a
function of the initial choice for Q(p) and because of the
particular choice of averaging process, we have
p0 ≃
∫
1
0
p Q0(p)dp±R (16)
where Q0(p) is the initial distribution. Of course, this
result is not exact as we have not weighted the averages
using the cluster sizes.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
Two simple extensions of the model of Egu´ıluz and
Zimmermann [14] have been proposed to model the gen-
eration of the demand mechanism. In the original model,
the level of transaction is arbitrarily fixed to a given
value of a, with a transaction happening every 1/a time
steps. In our models, agents are given a parameter p
that crudely models their characters, or more precisely,
the way they are perceived in the market. Two agents of
similar characters are supposed to get on quite well and
to be able to make temporary associations.
We distinguish between dictatorship-like associations,
where a group of agents rely on one of them to make de-
cision, and democratic-like associations, where the group
decision reflects an average of the characters of all the
agents belonging to the group. Both versions were in-
vestigated numerically and analytically, showing a very
reasonable agreement between the two types of results. It
is predicted and observed that agents in a democratic-like
model make more durable associations. As these associ-
ations are groups of agents making common decisions, it
results in very abrupt changes in the supply and demand
balance. The resulting price, whose variations are de-
fined through the balance of demand and supply by Eq.
(1), has a very high volatility. This is what is known as
the herding effect. On the contrary, in the dictatorship
model, associations of agents are short-lived, giving less
large groups of agents and a lower volatility in the price.
Both models exhibit organization. The democratic
model is driven into a critical state where the average
size of groups of agents is diverging. Associating a group
of agents buying or selling with an avalanche, it is easy to
show that the democratic model is self-organized, the size
distribution of the avalanches being a power law. A sepa-
ration between the time scales of the connections between
agents and the separation of groups of agents is observed.
The dictatorship model also exhibits a level of organiza-
tion, with the spontaneous segregation of the agents into
two distinct populations. Agents in the same population
get on very well, making associations together. On the
contrary, agents in different populations are very unlikely
to connect. When two such groups of agents meet, it very
often results in the separation into independent agents of
one of the two groups. Because of the high probability of
this fragmentation process, large associations of agents
are very unlikely to form. The dictatorship model is not
self-organized because it can never reach a critical state.
These models are more elaborate versions of the orig-
inal models, because we attempt to model the demand
process. In the original models, the fragmentation rate
had to be tuned to a low value to ensure the appear-
ance of groups of agents of all sizes and reproduce the
herd effect observed in financial markets. We showed
here that the fragmentation rate could be low because of
democratic types of associations. Perhaps giving every-
body their say on the management of portfolios is not
the best way to ensure less volatile markets. Neverthe-
less, there remain still numerous rooms for improvements
in the models. For instance, the buying or selling decision
is made at random which is very unlikely to be realistic.
Further studies along these lines could concentrate on in-
cluding agents that analyse the returns before making a
decision, as in [17].
Variations of the democratic rule have also been inves-
tigated, for instance weighting the value of p after con-
nection of two clusters according to the cluster sizes. The
definition of the rangeR has also been modified, choosing
a range that is proportional to the size of the cluster that
makes a transaction. Instead of breaking at random one
of the two clusters when they are not connected, we also
investigated the possibility that it is always the cluster
with the greater p that is fragmented. All these varia-
tions produced results that were qualitatively the same
as one of our two models. Consequently, our results are
robust and representative of this class of models.
[1] J.-P. Bouchaud and M. Potters,The´orie des risques fi-
nanciers (Alea-Saclay, Paris, 1997).
[2] R. N. Mantegna and H. E. Stanley,An Introduction to
Econophysics: Correlations and Complexity in Finance
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999).
[3] N.Vandewalle and M.Ausloos, Int. J. Mod. Phys. C 9,
711-720 (1998).
[4] N. Vandewalle and M. Ausloos, Physica A 268, 240-249
(1999).
[5] B. Mandelbrot, Journal of Business 36, 46 (1963).
[6] P. Gopikrishnan, V. Plerou, L. A. Nunes Amaral, M.
Meyer and H. E. Stanley, preprint cond-mat/9905305.
[7] L. Bachelier, Ann. Sci. Ecole Norm. Sup.3, 21 (1900).
[8] P. Bak, M. Paczuski and M. Shubik, preprint cond-
mat/9609144.
[9] R. Engle,ARCH: selected readings (Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1995).
[10] R. Cont and J.-P. Bouchaud, Macroeconomic Dynamics
in press, preprint cond-mat/9712318.
[11] D. S. Scharfstein and J. C. Stein, American Economic
Review 80, 465 (1990).
[12] B. Trueman, Review of financial studies 7, 97 (1994).
[13] M. Grinblatt, S. Titman and R. Wermers, American Eco-
nomic Review 85, 1088 (1995).
[14] V. M. Egu´ıluz and M. G. Zimmermann, preprint cond-
mat/9908069.
[15] R. d’Hulst and G. J. Rodgers, to be published in IJTAF
(cond-mat/9908481).
[16] P. Bak, How Nature Works: the Science of Self-Organized
Criticality (Copernicus, New York, 1996).
[17] R. d’Hulst and G. J. Rodgers, preprint adap-
org/9904003.
6
